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BOOK REVIEWS
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY. Edited by
Thomas Campbell and Robert Sylvester. Seattle: University of
Washington Press. 1968. Pp. xvi, 253. $9.50.
This book has little to say about either resource management or
public policy. It does deal with water, for it is a collection of ar-
ticles by writers representing diverse intellectual disciplines who
explore a variety of water resource problems primarily. as they re-
late to Washington State.
Two chapters deal with water law. Professor Ralph Johnson
discusses the changing role of the courts in water-quality manage-
ment. This is a very short chapter aimed at giving the non-lawyer
some idea of the present trend away from court created water law
toward a legal system created and operated by the comprehensive
water management agencies. Mr. William Van Ness follows this
chapter with a survey of Washington water law which comprises
one-fifth of the book.
Washington along with Oregon and California are three polit-
ical entities that each have a fascinating and complex body of
water law. These states recognize both of the two major theories
of water rights, appropriation and riparian rights. They also have
a modern administrative permit system for both surface and sub-
surface waters. The dry eastern part of Washington provides
the problems endemic to arid lands as well as irrigation and other
agricultural water problems. The industrialized western part of the
state presents the difficult problems of pollution control and man-
agement of water for multiple uses. The result is that an analysis
of Washington problems is a very good survey of modern water
law.
Most of the other articles are well done. The chapter on the
economics of agricultural water use is very informative, the chapter
on benefit-cost analysis is more technical but is also -well done.
The chapter on Water Resource Development in California, how-
ever, is a good example of the specialist substituting jargon for
communication. This type of writing is all too common in the
academic world and there is no reason for it. Forttiately most
articles in this book are quite readable. Because the flood of infor-
mation thrust before us is unrelenting, information that is not well
written is ignored. If unrelated disciplines are to cooperate in
solving common problems then communication is vital:
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To put together a book written by 16 men is not easy, but the
inherent complexity of assembling the work of writers from a
plethora of specialties - law, engineering, economics, biology,
and hydrology - does not justify the book's aimless meandering
through these various disciplines. Unfortunately, because of the
diverse interests of the writers and the inability of the editors to
construct and retain a central theme, the bulk of the book is of
interest to the reader seeking an insight into related disciplines
that touch on resources management and public policy, but it is not
helpful from the standpoint of focusing the reader's attention to
the central problem of management and its need to bring together
all disciplines. The narrow scope of some articles precludes treat-
ment of, and deludes the reader into the assumption that broader
inquest is not necessary for other equally important but ignored
problems. Topics such as ground-water hydrology of the Pull-
man-Moscow Basin, the eutrophication of Lake Washington, water
resource development in California, and economics of water use
represent a collection of papers on water resources by specialists
not really bent on interrelating their particular problem to the
whole of resources management.
This book could then be analogized to a stew made from the
contents of yesterday's conference. As such it can be sampled as
a totality or the more discriminating partaker can select the meat,
perhaps some of the starch, and reject the gristle and other in-
edibles. If the reader needs basic nutrition this text can supply
valuable nourishment though many essential nutrients are missing.
For the well fed - picking the meat can be satisfying.
ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR.*
WOMEN AND THE LAw: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. By Leo
Kanowitz. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1969.
Pp. ix, 302. $8.95.
If the 1960's was the decade of concern for the rights of under-
privileged minorities, the 1970's may become the era when the
nation focuses on discrimination against that not-so-silent major-
ity,' American women. Despite great changes in the subservient
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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position occupied by women at common law, women are still rele-
gated to "second-sex" '2 citizenship by law and lore.
Sexual discrimination by the law has continued to win the toler-
ance, if not the approval, of the United States Supreme Court, long
after the Court has invalidated legal differentials based on race'
and other innate characteristics.4 In 1948 a state ban on women
bartenders was ruled valid against an equal protection challenge.5
As recently as 1961 the Court upheld a Florida statute which pro-
vided that a -woman could be called for jury duty only if she regis-
tered with the clerk of the court - a procedure which resulted in
less than one-half of one percent of potential female jurors actually
being placed on the jury rolls.6
Women and the Law by Leo Kanowitz, a University of New
Mexico law professor, is a speedy survey of the myriad areas in
which the law treats men and women differently. His theme is
simple: When the law stops differentiating between the sexes on
the basis of "irrelevant and artificially created distinctions," men
and women will come to see each other primarily as fellow human
beings and only secondarily as representatives of the other sex.'
To this end, Kanowitz attacks not only those legal distinctions,
such as the contractual incapacity of married women, based on
"old-fAshioned male supremacist notions,"" but also those laws
which extend special protections to women because of their pur-
ported physical and emotional fragility.
The first portion of Women and the Law is devoted to legal
distinctions which apply to all women, whether married or single.
Such laws are harmful, according to Kanowitz, because they help
to perpetuate a double standard in sexual and social expectations.
1 In 1969, according to the Bureau of the Census, there were nearly 103 million
females in the United States, compared with 99 million males. N.Y. TIMs, ENCY-
cLOPEDIA ALMANAC 1970, at 205 (1969).
2 S. DEBEAUVOIR, THE SEcOND SEX (Bantam ed. 1961).
3 E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 294 (1954).
4 E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
5 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
SHoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). But see United States v. Dege, 364 U.S.
51 (1960), overturning the common law rule that a husband and wife cannot be guilty
of criminal conspiracy if they conspire only between themselves. If the doctrine is
based on the assumption that a wife must be presumed to act under her husband's
coercive influence, and therefore involuntarily, wrote Justice Frankfurter for the major-
ity, this implies "a view of American womanhood offensive to the ethos of our society."
Id. at 53.
7 L KANOWriZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 4 (1969).
8Id. at 53.
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Thus the prostitution laws punish the female prostitute but not her
male customer. Even the younger marriage age for women, Kano-
witz believes, tends to discourage young women from seeking fur-
ther education or employment and to wed them early to the kitchen
and the cradle. The result, says Kanowitz, is to confirm traditional
stereotypes concerning the "proper" roles of women and men.
In the area of political rights as well, the law treats women as
creatures to be specially pampered. Although women have been
voting equally with men for 50 years, fewer than half the states
require women jurors to serve equally with men. As of 1961, only
21 states made women eligible on the same basis as men; eight states
excused women if family responsibilities would make service a
hardship; 18 accorded an absolute exemption to all women whether
married or single; and three excluded female jurors altogether,9 a
practice recently held unconstitutional by a three-judge federal
district court in Alabama.10
Kanowitz devotes the second part of his book to the legal treat-
ment of married women, a field still clouded by the medieval fic-
tion of the unity of husband and wife, which gave the husband con-
trol over his wife's person and property. Although the most ex-
treme aspects of this doctrine have been ameliorated by the Married
Women's Acts," Kanowitz singles out the pockets of legal resis-
tance which remain to the full emancipation of married women.
Thus while nearly all states allow a husband to recover for loss of
consortium when his wife is negligently injured, only about 17
jurisdictions grant a similar cause of action to a wife whose hus-
band has been hurt.' 2 In a handful of states, married women are
still limited in their capacity to make contracts, convey real prop-
erty, or otherwise engage in business.'3 In Florida, for example, a
married woman must get court approval before she can manage
her own property. Her petition must state her age, "her character,
habits, education and mental capacity for business and briefly set
out the reasons why the disabilities [to manage her estate] should
be removed."' 4  The woman must obtain her husband's consent
or serve him with a copy of the petition.
5
9 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62-63 & nn.6-8 (1961).
10 White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
11 See L KANowrTz, supra note 7, at 40.
12 Id. at 84-85.
131d. at 55-59.
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 62.021(3) (1969).
15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 62.021(4) (1969).
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The criminal law, Kanowitz shows, has also clung tenaciously
to the feudal fiction of the unity of husband and wife. Most states
still retain the rule that since husband and wife are one, they cannot
be convicted of criminal conspiracy if they plot only between them-
selves. The absurdity of this principle was pointed out by Chief
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in one of the few
decisions to reject the rule, when he wrote that the fiction of the
unity of husband and wife "has been substantially vitiated by the
overwhelming evidence that one plus one adds up to two, even in
twogethemess."16
While such legal fossils are still preserved in law books, the
area where anti-female discrimination actively flourishes is employ-
ment. For example, although women comprise approximately 40
percent of the work force, in 1966 less than I percent earned sal-
aries of $10,000 or more; the proportion for men was almost 20
times greater.' In the past few years, Congress has passed two laws
aimed at ending such discrimination, the Equal Pay Act of 19638
and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 9 which bars discrimina-
tion based on sex in hiring and conditions of employment. The
chapters which Kanowitz devotes to analysis of these statutes are the
most creative in his book.
Title VII, he points out, was aimed originally at racial prejudice
in employment. The insertion of a ban on sex discrimination as
well came just one day before the Act was passed, in an apparent
attempt to defeat the entire bill, by Representative Howard Smith
of Virginia, a staunch civil rights foe."0 Because of this hasty his-
tory, Congress made no attempt to reconcile the new prohibition on
sex discrimination with the long-standing state protective laws
which provide for minimum wages and maximum hours for female
employees. Kanowitz suggests several formulae for harmonizing
the federal and state legislation, concluding that the best approach
by which to preserve the social goals of the protective laws while
granting equal opportunity to women is to extend the maximum
hour-minimum wage standards to male employees, too. If the states
16 People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2& 879, 880, 395 P.2d 893, 894, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845,
846 (1964), cited in L KANOWITZ, supra note 7, at 86.
17 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CoMM., TowARD JOB EQUALITY FOR WOMEN 2 (1969).
s 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1964).
1942 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
20 L KANOwiTZ, supra note 7, at 104-05.
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 348
fail to do this by legislation, Kanowitz suggests that the Supreme
Court could properly do so under the equal protection clause.2 '
While Women and the Law is a conscientious project in legal
research, as a book it is disappointing. First; Kanowitz's writing
style is tedious. The book reads like a 200-page law review article
(in fact several chapters have appeared in various legal journals),
which makes up in footnotes what it lacks in readability. In terms
of substance, too, the book is faulty. Too often Kanowitz develops
a lengthy argument on the basis of assumptions which he fails to
document. Thus he declares that women have been paid consider-
ably less than men for the same work.22 While this may well be
true, the only support cited is a comparison of the median earnings
of American men as a whole with those of women;213 he gives no
examples of unequal pay on identical jobs. Elsewhere he criticizes
statutory rape 'laws for failing to extend their protection to young
boys as well as girls. "If sexual intercourse is objectively harmful
for persons of tender years, then it should be equally harmful for
young males as well as young females," he writes.24 This is a doubt-
ful assumption at best, and Kanowitz offers no proof.
The statutory rape example illustrates another flaw in Women
and the Law: Kanowitz fails to distinguish the molehills from the
mountains. He devotes seven pages to discussing the impact of
statutory rape laws, while discriminatory jury provisions rate only
three pages. Too often he dwells at length on statutes which
have long been abolished. Thus he spends two and one-half pages
detailing health laws which required males, but not females, to
prove their freedom from venereal disease before marrying; today,
as Kanowitz himself notes,25 only Washington retains this distinc-
2 1 Kanowitz argues that the Court would not be "legislating" by ruling that the
equal protection clause requires coverage for men. He points out that:
[The] 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York, invalidating hours limitation
for both sexes and the 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon, sustaining similar
legislation for women only had much to do with influencing the states to
enact such laws only for women, on the principle that half a loaf was better
than none. In effect, it was the past conduct of the U.S. Supreme Court it-
self which largely, if not entirely, accounted for the proliferation of state pro-
tective laws applying to women only. L. KANOWrrZ, supra note 7, at 184.
After the Court reversed Lochner in United States v. Darling, 312 U.S. 100 (1940),
the states failed to extend the previous "women only" protections to men. By doing
this under an equal protection rationale, Kanowitz contends, the Court would be simply
"atoning" for its earlier error. Id. at 183-85.
22Id. at 101.
23 Id. at 277 n.7.
24 Id. at 23.
25Id. at 13-15.
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tion. Criminal abortion laws, by contrast, receive only two pages,
in which Kanowitz omits any mention of recent reforms.
Finally, and most significantly, Kanowitz's basic premise may
be faulty. While law undoubtedly exercises a considerable influ-
ence on human relations, except for the employment and abortion
laws most of the legal relics with which he is concerned have little
real impact on the status of women. In fact, non-legal advances,
such as modern birth control methods and the establishment of
child care centers, will probably do a great deal more to change
women's lives than would arresting prostitutes' customers or hold-
ing a husband and wife guilty of criminal conspiracy. In the final
analysis, Women and the Law, while a useful reference work,
contributes little beyond the compilation of raw legal information.
ELLEN CUMMINGS*
* A.B. Radcliffe College 1966 and presently a third-year student at Case Western
Reserve School of Law.
